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Arguments about the evolutionary function o f  phenomenal consciousness are beset by 
the problem o f  epiphenomenalism. For if  it is not clear whether phenomenal conscious­
ness has a causal role, then it is difficult to  begin an argument for the evolutionary role 
o f  phenomenal consciousness. We argue that complexity arguments offer a way around 
this problem. According to evolutionary biology, the structural complexity o f  a given 
organ can provide evidence that the organ is an adaptation, even if  nothing is known  
about the causal role o f  the organ. Evidence from cognitive neuropsychology suggests 
that phenomenal consciousness is structurally complex in the relevant way, and this 
provides prima facie evidence that phenomenal consciousness is an adaptation. Fur­
thermore, we argue that the complexity o f  phenomenal consciousness might also pro­
vide clues about the causal role o f  phenomenal consciousness.
1. Introduction. In a recent paper, Owen Flanagan and Thomas Polger 
propose that explaining why consciousness evolved is “the hardest prob­
lem in consciousness studies.” (1995, 313) Not only are there “no credible 
explanations” o f the evolution o f consciousness (1995,321), the possibility 
of zombies (i.e., organisms that are behaviorally indistinguishable from us 
but lack consciousness) raises a serious question about the adaptive sig-
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nificance o f phenomenal consciousness. (1995) In this paper, we take up 
Flanagan and Polger’s challenge to provide a more credible argument for 
the claim that phenomenal consciousness is an adaptation.
Recent discussions o f the evolution o f consciousness have focused on 
two interrelated issues. The first set o f issues concerns how and why con­
sciousness emerged in the course o f evolution. For example, did conscious­
ness arise through natural selection, or did it evolve as a free rider? These 
questions concern the evolutionary function o f consciousness. The diffi­
culty o f specifying the evolutionary function o f consciousness is exacer­
bated by a quite different issue, the epiphenomenalist worry that phenom­
enal consciousness doesn’t play any significant causal role function in 
shaping human action. (Block 1995) The combined problem of character­
izing both the evolutionary and causal role function o f consciousness pres­
ents an extremely difficult challenge to any argument that phenomenal 
consciousness is an adaptation. Since we are not sure whether phenomenal 
consciousness plays any significant causal role in human thought, it has 
been hard to address the issue o f how and why phenomenal consciousness 
evolved.
We offer an approach that circumvents these difficulties. We will argue 
that there is reason to think that phenomenal consciousness is an adap­
tation even in the absence o f any characterization o f the evolutionary or 
causal role function o f phenomenal consciousness. According to contem­
porary evolutionary biology, it is reasonable to assume that complex bio­
logical structures are adaptations—even if we do not know precisely how 
the organ functions or how it evolved. The complexity o f phenomenal 
consciousness thus provides an argument that phenomenal consciousness 
is an adaptation. By providing evidence that consciousness is an adapta­
tion, the complexity argument can simultaneously undercut the epiphen­
omenalist suspicion. For if consciousness is an adaptation, it must have 
some causal effect on fitness. Indeed, if we can establish that phenomenal 
consciousness is an adaptation, we think that this might provide a basis 
for developing a partial account o f the evolutionary and causal role func­
tions o f phenomenal consciousness. Before we can make our case, we need 
to briefly review recent debates over the function o f phenomenal con­
sciousness.
2. Epiphenomenalism and Causal Role Function. It is tempting to begin the 
search for the evolutionary function o f consciousness by establishing the 
causal role function o f consciousness. However, epiphenomenalism poses 
a familiar problem for any attempt to establish the causal role o f con­
sciousness. For any proposed function o f consciousness, it’s easy to con­
struct a story in which consciousness plays no causal role but rather is
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merely epiphenomenal. As Flanagan puts it, the “epiphenomenalist sus­
picion is extraordinarily hard to dispel.” (1992, 133)
In the last decade, several theorists have tried to discredit epiphenom- 
enalism by appealing to empirical findings on psychopathologies. These 
psychopathology arguments maintain that epiphenomenalism is under­
mined by evidence that apparent deficits in phenomenal consciousness are 
correlated with apparent cognitive and behavioral deficits. This kind of 
argument has been suggested by several prominent theorists (e.g., Marcel 
1986, Van Gulick 1989, Flanagan 1992, and Searle 1992). Perhaps the 
most detailed version o f the argument is offered by Flanagan (1992). He 
writes:
There are all sorts o f cases o f neurological deficits linked with deficits 
in subjective consciousness, and in many o f these cases the incapaci­
tation o f subjective consciousness seems to explain some further in­
capacity . . . .  Blindsighted patients never initiate activity toward the 
blindfield because they lack subjective awareness o f things in that field. 
Prosopagnosiacs don’t consciously recognize familiar faces. Thus they 
don’t rush to greet long-lost friends, even though their hearts go pitter- 
patter when they see them. (1992, 145)
Flanagan maintains that these correlations between subjective deficits and 
cognitive deficits help to show the function of consciousness. “The infer­
ence to the best explanation is that conscious awareness o f the environ­
ment facilitates semantic comprehension and adaptive motor control ac­
tions in creatures like us.” (1992, 141-142)
Although Flanagan’s argument is enticing, Block (1995) maintains that 
psychopathology arguments conflate two distinct notions o f conscious­
ness, phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Phenomenal 
consciousness, according to Block, is experience: “P-consciousness prop­
erties include the experiential properties o f sensations, feelings, and per­
ceptions, but I would also include thoughts, desires, and emotions.” 
(Block 1995, 230) Access consciousness, on Block’s view, is characterized 
by information-processing features:
A state is access conscious (A-conscious) if, in virtue o f one’s having 
the state, a representation o f its content is (1) inferentially promiscu­
ous (Stich 1978), that is, poised for use as a premise in reasoning, (2) 
poised for rational control o f action, and (3) poised for rational con­
trol o f speech. (1995, 231)
This gloss places access consciousness comfortably within the rich tradi­
tion o f information-processing explanations in cognitive science. “A per­
ceptual state is access-conscious roughly speaking if its content. . .  is pro­
cessed via that information processing function. . .  whereby it can be used
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to control reasoning and behavior.” (Block 1995, 229) Block’s argument, 
then, is that although blindsight patients lack phenomenal consciousness 
of the relevant stimulus, say a cup of water, the fact that they don’t reach 
for the cup o f water might also be explained by their lack o f access con­
sciousness.
Block maintains that access consciousness and phenomenal conscious­
ness must be distinguished conceptually and that there may even be em­
pirical cases in which access consciousness is present without phenomenal 
consciousness. To illustrate this, Block suggests that it is at least concep­
tually possible that a blindsight patient could learn to rely on information 
in his blindfield to initiate behavior, and in this case, the person would 
have access consciousness o f visual stimuli without phenomenal con­
sciousness. Block calls this “superblindsight” and suggests that Nicholas 
Humphrey’s monkey Helen might be an actual case o f superblindsight. 
Humphrey agrees:
Helen, several years after removal o f the visual cortex, developed a 
virtually normal capacity for ambient spatial vision, such that she 
could move around under visual guidance just like any other monkey. 
This was certainly unprompted, and in that respect ‘super’ blindsight. 
(Humphrey 1995, 257)
Weiskrantz also maintains that the case o f Helen indicates that “under 
pressure the visual capacity may recover some o f its sensitivity and ability 
to respond without prompting.” (Weiskrantz 1997, 178) As a result, there 
is some reason to think that it’s possible to have access consciousness o f  
sensory input without having phenomenal consciousness o f the input.
Of course, Humphrey’s Helen certainly does not behave like a normally 
sighted monkey. In particular, Helen seems incapable o f categorizing ob­
jects (e.g., food/non-food) on the basis o f visual information. (Humphrey 
1974, 245) It remains to be seen whether the psychopathology argument 
against epiphenomenalism might be redeployed to argue that, while phe­
nomenal consciousness may not be necessary for access consciousness, it’s 
necessary for something else, e.g., categorization o f sensory input. One 
reason to be skeptical o f this move is that it seems that the categorization 
o f sensory input can happen without phenomenal consciousness. For ex­
ample, in unilateral neglect, subjects behave as though half o f their visual 
field is absent, yet they seem to exhibit implicit understanding o f the visual 
information. In one widely cited study, researchers showed a subject two 
pictures o f a house, one with flames coming out o f the left side o f the 
house. The subject claimed that the two houses were identical, but when 
asked to choose which house she’d rather live in, she reliably picked the 
one that was not on fire. (Marshall and Halligan 1988) In this case, then,
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it seems that the subject was making the proper categorization of a visual 
input without being phenomenally conscious o f it.
As these examples suggest, the burgeoning literature on psychopathol­
ogies presents us with an extremely complex set o f correlations between 
deficits in phenomenal consciousness and deficits in information process­
ing capacities. And it is quite unclear whether there is any general infor­
mation-processing function for which phenomenal consciousness is nec­
essary. If this is right, then the epiphenomenalist threat continues to pose 
a problem for the argument from psychopathology.
Thus, if Block’s influential critique o f the psychopathology argument 
is right, then epiphenomenalism still poses a serious difficulty for the at­
tempt to establish the causal role function o f consciousness. However, we 
will argue that the evidence from psychopathologies can serve a rather 
different kind o f argument against epiphenomenalism. To develop this 
argument, we need to turn to evolutionary biology.
3. Comparison and Complexity: Methods for Studying Cognitive Adapta­
tions. It is hard to demonstrate conclusively that natural selection shaped 
extinct populations. This problem is particularly acute for evolutionary 
psychology because behaviors and cognitive mechanisms do not leave any 
fossils. In a previous paper, we argued that evolutionary psychologists can 
draw upon evolutionary biology’s impressive array o f tools to determine 
whether a given trait is likely to be an adaptation (see, e.g., Rose and 
Lauder 1996). In particular, we suggested that the comparative method 
and complexity arguments can be used to show that mental traits are 
adaptations. (Grantham and Nichols, 1999) In this section, we explain 
how these strategies can be used to support adaptationist accounts of 
cognitive mechanisms and consider briefly whether these strategies can be 
applied to phenomenal consciousness.
3.1. Comparative Arguments. The comparative method is one of the 
most important techniques for formulating and testing natural selection 
hypotheses. (Krebs and Davies 1984; Harvey and Pagel 1991) Two differ­
ent kinds o f comparison are generally used. First, morphological and be­
havioral differences among closely related species may indicate adaptive 
divergence—especially if morphological traits correlate with ecological 
variables. Second, if distantly related species found in similar niches dis­
play similar morphologies, then this may indicate that the morphological 
traits are adaptations to that niche.
The well-known case o f testis size in primates illustrates how compar­
ative biology can support the claim that a trait is an adaptation. Chim­
panzees have much larger testes than the other great apes (humans, go­
rillas, orangutans). This difference among closely related species suggests
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that large testis size might be because o f sperm competition. Chimps live 
in multi-male troops and females often mate with multiple males during 
estrus. Males who produce more sperm should have an advantage in 
sperm competition. Gorillas and orangutans have strikingly different mat­
ing systems: only one male has access to females during estrus. Harcourt 
and colleagues (1981) gathered additional comparative data to test this 
hypothesis. Even after accounting for the fact that testis size tends to in­
crease with body size, genera with multi-male breeding systems have sig­
nificantly larger testes than closely related genera with monogamous or 
single-male breeding systems. This comparative data confirms the hypoth­
esis that large testis size evolved to aid in sperm competition within multi­
male breeding systems.
The comparative method shows considerable promise for exploring the 
evolutionary origins o f mental traits. For example, comparative psychol­
ogists are exploring the relation between the mental capacities o f human 
infants and non-human primates in understanding objects (e.g., Hauser 
and Carey 1998, Uller et al. 1997). Although this comparative approach 
to cognitive mechanisms is quite new, it’s easy to see how it might help us 
to determine the evolutionary function of cognitive mechanisms. If we can 
determine the distribution of a cognitive mechanism across related species, 
we can explore the ecological similarities and differences between species 
that have (and those that lack) the cognitive mechanism. This will help to 
determine whether the trait is an adaptation and the likely evolutionary 
function of the trait. „
The comparative method looks promising for exploring (non-species 
specific) mental traits, and some have used comparative arguments to 
maintain that phenomenal consciousness is an adaptation (e.g., Flanagan 
1992, 133). However, we think that the comparative method is poorly 
suited to determining whether phenomenal consciousness is an adaptation. 
First, we do not have good tests for identifying the presence or absence 
o f consciousness. Despite the lack o f good evidence, many philosophers 
assume that all vertebrates have phenomenal consciousness. We are per­
fectly willing to adopt this assumption, but that raises a second difficulty. 
Comparative arguments are only effective when we can compare related 
species that vary with respect to the trait o f interest. If all vertebrates have 
phenomenal consciousness, it’s possible that consciousness evolved only 
once and was phylogenetically conserved. In sum, we cannot distinguish 
between species that have and lack consciousness in a fine-grained way; 
but it is precisely this kind o f distinction (between related species that have 
and lack consciousness) which would be necessary to apply the compar­
ative method. So the comparative method is currently o f no use for de­
termining whether phenomenal consciousness is an adaptation.
3.2. Complexity Arguments. The notion o f “complexity” has been un­
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derstood in a variety o f different and sometimes conflicting ways (see, e.g., 
Wimsatt 1974, McShea 1997, Shanks and Joplin 1999). To complicate 
matters further, “complexity” is intimately associated with several other 
contested terms, including “order,” “randomness,” and “organization.” 
Though the search for a precise definition is worthwhile—particularly 
when one is working within a well-articulated theoretical or practical con­
text—we will pursue a different method. Instead o f offering yet another 
definition, we articulate the idea o f complexity through exemplars, begin­
ning with the vertebrate eye as an example o f functional complexity. We 
then introduce a second exemplar, the lateral line in fish, which allows us 
to extend the notion o f complexity to cases in which we do not have any 
prior understanding o f the function o f the organ.1
Biologists maintain that the only legitimate explanation for complex 
and seemingly purposeful organs is natural selection. For example, Ridley 
(1993, ch. 13) argues that natural selection is the only known explanation 
o f “purposive and often complex” adaptations. Ridley is not claiming that 
all adaptations are complex. In fact, the loss o f complexity can be adaptive 
(e.g., simplification o f an intestinal parasite’s digestive system). But if an 
organ is complex, evolutionary theorists maintain that we can be confident 
that it is an adaptation. In Pinker and Bloom’s words, “natural selection 
is the only scientific explanation o f adaptive complexity.” (1990, 709)2 
Thus, the complexity o f a trait provides good grounds for thinking the 
trait is an adaptation, even if we cannot provide a full adaptation expla­
nation for its origin.
This “complexity principle” will not be useful (or testable) unless sci­
entists can actually identify complex traits. Pinker and Bloom assert that 
complex systems are “composed of many interacting parts where the de­
tails o f the parts’ structure and arrangement suggest design to fulfill some 
function.” (1990, 709) That is, complex traits contain a diversity o f parts 
that are organized so that the parts contribute to the achievement o f some 
function.3 To use a hackneyed (but still impressive) example, consider the
1. Throughout this discussion, we will focus exclusively on complexity in biological 
systems.
2. Advocates o f  “complexity theory” (e.g., Kauffman 1995) maintain that complexity 
can emerge through a process o f  “self-organization.” W e remain skeptical. To date, 
complexity theorists have not provided any compelling examples in which functional 
complexity is explained solely as a result o f  self-organization.
3. Pinker and Bloom ’s claim that “ natural selection is the only scientific explanation o f  
adaptive complexity” verges on a tautology. I f  adaptations are, by definition, the result 
o f  natural selection, then all adaptive complexity must be a result o f  natural selection. 
One can avoid this potential circularity by distinguishing causal role function and evo­
lutionary function. The fact that the parts are well-organized to achieve a causal role 
function can be used to support the historical claim that the trait either originated by 
(or was subsequently shaped by) natural selection.
Copyright © 2000. All rights reserved.
ADAPTIVE COMPLEXITY AND PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS 655
vertebrate eye. The eye contains a number o f parts including the cornea, 
iris, lens, muscles, and retina. Each of these parts is well-suited to playing 
some important role in the overall function o f the organ: the cornea pro­
tects the eye, the iris controls the amount o f light entering the eye, the lens 
focuses light on the retina, muscles allow for variable focus, different cells 
are sensitive to different wavelengths o f light, etc. Thus, the eye is com­
posed o f a number o f parts, each o f which seems to contribute to the 
organ’s ability to achieve the function o f vision. There are two primary 
reasons for thinking that organs with this kind o f complexity are adap­
tations. First, it is highly unlikely that a sequence o f undirected and un­
selected variation could first produce and then coordinate the actions of 
these multiple sub-units. Second, a complex trait would eventually dete­
riorate unless it was favored by selection.
Pinker and Bloom (1990) extend the complexity argument to mental 
traits and appeal to the complexity o f language as evidence that language 
is an adaptation. Recent work in psycholinguistics indicates that the “lan­
guage organ” contains a number o f distinct cognitive processors that in­
teract in complex ways to accomplish the function o f understanding lan­
guage. Psycholinguists maintain that language understanding involves 
phoneme recognition, phonological analysis, lexical analysis, and parsing 
among other sub-processes (see, e.g., Caplan 1992). Further, we have rea­
son to think that at least some of these sub-processes are functionally 
discrete. For instance, Swinney found that semantic lexical analysis is 
informationally encapsulated. (Swinney 1979) And syntactic comprehen­
sion is selectively damaged in Broca’s aphasics. (Schwartz et al. 1980) 
Because the language organ is hypothesized to contain several different 
sub-mechanisms (differentiation o f elements), which interact smoothly 
and quickly to explain the speed o f language understanding (functional 
coordination o f the elements), the language faculty is a promising place 
to launch a complexity argument.4
Complexity arguments have been invoked to argue that phenomenal 
consciousness is an adaptation (e.g., Flanagan 1992, 134). However, in­
sofar as the complexity arguments rely on the kind o f functional com­
plexity exemplified by the eye, these arguments will run up against the 
problem o f epiphenomenalism. In characterizing the complexity o f the eye, 
we assumed that the eye functions to provide visual information about the 
environment. And it is this background understanding o f the function of
4. We have modified Pinker and Bloom ’s argument somewhat. They argue that the 
complexity o f  language (e.g., grammar) is evidence that language is an adaptation. We 
think that it’s more compelling to appeal to the complexity o f  the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying language comprehension (or production) as evidence that the capacity to 
understand (or produce) language is an adaptation (see Grantham and N ichols 1999).
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the eye which supports the claim that the various components o f the eye 
are ‘well-suited’ to facilitate vision. To deploy a similar complexity argu­
ment for phenomenal consciousness would require prior knowledge o f the 
function o f phenomenal consciousness, and thus would beg the question 
against the epiphenomenalist.
4. “Anatomical” Complexity and Phenomenal Consciousness. Although 
functional complexity arguments for phenomenal consciousness run up 
against epiphenomenalism, evolutionary biology provides a different kind 
o f complexity argument as well. We will argue in this section that even 
without specifying the function of phenomenal consciousness, the com­
plexity o f phenomenal consciousness indicates that it is an adaptation.
4.1. Anatomical Complexity Arguments in Biology. Although complex­
ity arguments often rely on prior knowledge o f what the organ does, 
knowledge o f causal role function is not necessary to launch a complexity 
argument. Several biological theorists argue that if an organ exhibits suf­
ficient structural complexity, we can infer that the organ is an adaptation, 
even if we don’t know what the function o f the organ is. For instance, 
Robert Brandon writes,
There are features whose usefulness is unclear for which we still reject 
chance explanations because o f their high degree o f complexity and 
constancy. A good example is lateral lines in fish. This organ is struc­
turally complex and shows a structural constancy within taxa, yet 
until recently it was not known how the lateral line was useful to its 
possessor.” (1997, 8)
Brandon’s inference that selection must have shaped the lateral line system 
is based on the structure o f the system, without any knowledge o f how the 
parts interact or any knowledge o f the function o f the system. We refer to 
this as an “anatomical” complexity argument to distinguish it from tra­
ditional complexity arguments that draw freely on prior knowledge o f the 
function(s) o f the organ.
The lateral line system mentioned by Brandon above provides one in­
fluential example o f an anatomical complexity argument. But it is hardly 
the only such argument. Another well-known anatomical complexity ar­
gument concerns Lorenzini’s ampullae. Sharks have several globular 
structures, ampullae, located throughout the head region, and these struc­
tures are always associated with the nervous system. Even before their 
function was known, the complexity o f the ampullae w'as so apparent that 
biologists assumed the ampullae must have some biological function. Bi­
ologists eventually found that the ampullae functioned to aid sharks in 
finding prey in the mud. Maynard Smith describes the example as follows:
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“Curio (1973) makes the valid point that the ampullae o f Lorenzini in 
elasmobranchs were studied for many years before their role in enabling 
fish to locate prey buried in the mud was demonstrated, yet the one hy­
pothesis that was never entertained was that the organ was functionless.” 
(Maynard Smith 1978,97) The complex structure o f the ampullae suggests 
that they are adaptations, even if we have no idea about the function o f 
the organ.
Returning to our initial example, the lateral line system in fish is com­
posed o f several distinct “lateral line organs” located along the length of 
the fish, which provide input to the lateral line nerve (see Figure 1). Curio 
(1973) and Brandon (1997) both note that biologists inferred that the lat­
eral line system was an adaptation before they knew the function o f the 
system. Biologists now maintain that the lateral line system helps the fish 
to gauge water currents, and to monitor low-frequency sounds and pres­
sure waves from moving objects. Among other things, this helps fish to 
locate prey.
One reason for treating anatomical complexity as evidence o f adapta­
tion is that the construction o f a complex trait requires energy. As a result, 
complex traits that do not enhance fitness will either passively deteriorate 
or be actively selected against. The lateral line system contains a number 
of elements: a system of tubular channels, the lateral line organs, and the 
nerves which are connected to the lateral line organs. Furthermore, the 
various elements o f the lateral line system stand in particular spatial re­
lations: the channels extend all the way to the fish’s outer surface, the 
lateral line organs always protrude slightly into the channel and connect 
to a nerve, etc. These spatial relations are regularly repeated among con- 
specific organisms. The precise spatial arrangement o f the elements is one 
o f the striking features o f the lateral line system. Presumably, it takes a 
significant amount o f energy and special genetic/developmental mecha­
nisms to create these structures and to ensure that they are connected in 
the correct way. Because these structures (and their spatial relations) are 
reliably formed even though they are energetically expensive, one suspects 
that they perform some significant (fitness enhancing) function. If they did 
not perform any function, one would expect them to deteriorate.
The supposition that the lateral line deteriorates when it is not needed 
has been confirmed through comparative studies. In one genus o f hagfish, 
the Myxinids, the lateral line system is absent, whereas in another genus, 
the Eptatretids, the lateral line system is sometimes present. This difference 
among hagfish species is explained by evolutionary considerations:
Hagfish in general are burrowers, spending much of their time buried 
up to their snouts in soft clay or silt . . .  It is reasonable to assume 
that skin pressed to clay permits little water flow past superficial lat-
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Figure 1. The lateral line system (from Purves et al. 1992, 852).
eral line organs.. . .  While both genera of hagfish burrow, there are 
anecdotal data that suggest eptatretids spend less time in burrows and 
may prefer rocky substrata . . .  This difference may explain the dif­
ference in distribution o f lateral line systems in the two genera. Re­
gressive evolution has been in progress since the ancestors o f hagfishes 
burrowed in the substrates, and has culminated in the complete loss
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of the system in myxinids, while the eptatretids have retained some 
vestige o f a system that might still function while above the substrate. 
(Braun and Northcutt 1998, 528)
In sum, the lateral line system in fish exhibits a kind o f anatomical com­
plexity that provided strong prima facie evidence that the system is an 
adaptation. Further research exposed the likely evolutionary function o f 
the system. And more recently, scientists have found that the lateral line 
system has deteriorated in species for which it is no longer useful.
4.2. Complexity o f  Phenomenal Consciousness. We maintain that phe­
nomenal consciousness shows a structural complexity analogous to that 
o f the lateral line system. But we want to begin with a couple o f caveats. 
For the purposes o f our discussion, w’e will put the problem of other minds 
to the side and simply assume that humans are conscious. We will also 
rely largely on self report in characterizing phenomenal consciousness.5 
There are obvious shortcomings with this source, but presumably any 
characterization o f phenomenal consciousness will rely on self report. We 
will argue that even without specifying any function o f phenomenal con­
sciousness, there is reason to think that consciousness is a complex system 
that unites input from a number o f independent channels.
4.2.1. Unity o f  Consciousness. The claim that phenomenal conscious­
ness is unified has a long history stretching through Kant and Descartes. 
More recently, John Searle has argued that the unity o f consciousness is 
an obvious feature o f phenomenal consciousness that any theory o f con­
sciousness needs to accommodate. Searle notes that consciousness enjoys 
two kinds o f unity. First, conscious experience is unified across short tem­
poral spans. (Searle 1992, 130) For example, our grasp o f a musical line 
requires that we have an awareness o f the first notes while we are hearing 
the last notes. The second kind o f unity is “the simultaneous awareness 
of all the diverse features o f any conscious state.” (Searle 1992,130) Searle 
writes,
I do not just have an experience o f a toothache and also a visual 
experience o f the couch that is situated a few feet from me and of 
roses that are sticking out from the vase on my right, in the way that 
I happen to have on a striped shirt at the same time as I have on dark
5. So, in this sense, we are not addressing a truly thorough-going epiphenomenalism  
according to which phenomenal consciousness doesn’t even affect self report. M ost o f  
the recent discussion o f  epiphenomenalism has focused on the weaker version o f  epi­
phenomenalism according to  which self report is affected by phenomenal consciousness 
(e.g., Block 1995; Chalmers 1996).
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blue socks . . . .  I have my experiences o f the rose, the couch, and the 
toothache all as experiences that are part o f one and the same con­
scious event. (1992, 129-130)
Searle claims that without these kinds o f unity we “could not make normal 
sense o f our experience.” (130) For our purposes, the important claim is 
that lots o f experiences from within and across modalities can be included 
in the same conscious state.
Although Searle maintains that the unity o f consciousness is an obvious 
and essential feature o f phenomenal consciousness, some researchers have 
suggested that the unity o f consciousness might be an illusion. If the ap­
parent unity o f phenomenal consciousness is completely illusory, then our 
complexity argument will fail. We are not inclined to get into the debate 
over the unity o f consciousness, but we would like to note that many of 
the complaints against the unity o f consciousness are orthogonal to our 
concerns. For instance, many have noted that conscious experience is het­
erogeneous (e.g., Dennett 1991, Flanagan 1995). Phenomenal conscious­
ness is not, even subjectively, homogeneous, and it can be important to 
distinguish between different kinds o f conscious experience. For instance, 
Flanagan maintains that phenomenal dreaming is a “good example o f one 
of the heterogeneous kinds o f conscious experience.” (1995, 1108) But 
notice that this doesn’t threaten the claim that phenomenal consciousness 
is unified in the senses outlined by Searle—indeed, a salient fact about 
phenomenal dreaming is that it displays unity in a way similar to waking 
experience. A rather different attack on the unity o f consciousness chal­
lenges the breadth o f the putative unity. Several writers have suggested 
that perhaps there isn’t a single center o f phenomenal consciousness in the 
mind (e.g., Flanagan 1992,191; Young 1994, 195). For our account, what 
will matter is not whether there is a single sphere o f phenomenal con­
sciousness in all normal humans. Rather, what will matter for us is that 
there is at least one system of phenomenal consciousness in normal hu­
mans that shows unity in including lots o f experiences from different 
mechanisms in the same conscious event. If it turns out that there are also 
additional independent systems o f phenomenal consciousness, that kind 
of disunity needn’t be troubling for our account.
For the remainder o f the paper, we’re going to adopt the assumption 
that the phenomenal consciousness system that underlies self report is 
unified. And when we refer to the phenomenal consciousness system, it is 
this unified system that we have in mind. If this assumption turns out to 
be a little bit off, such that there are a few phenomenal consciousness 
systems, that is probably okay for our argument. However, if the as­
sumption turns out to be wildly false, such that there is really no system 
of phenomenal consciousness that unites lots o f different experiences, then
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our argument will be defeated. However, there is little reason to think that 
the unity assumption is that wildly off-base, so we propose not to worry 
about it for the time being.
4.2.2. Multiple Input Mechanisms. Our second claim about the struc­
ture o f phenomenal consciousness is that it draws information through 
several independent input channels. The clearest evidence for this comes 
from w'ork on dissociations in neuropsychology. Neuropsychologists have 
found that selective brain damage can produce selective deficits in phe­
nomenal consciousness. This evidence, together with the claim that phe­
nomenal consciousness is unified, suggests that phenomenal consciousness 
is a complexly structured system.
A wide range o f evidence from neuropsychology suggests that subjects 
can have perceptual information in the mind without having that infor­
mation in phenomenal consciousness. Blindsight is the paradigm example 
here. The striate cortex is damaged in blindsight patients, and these pa­
tients claim to be blind in a certain part o f their visual field. However, 
these patients can ‘guess’ with impressive accuracy about what is in their 
‘blind’ field. Apparently then, in blindsight, the visual information is pres­
ent in the brain, but the information does not reach the phenomenal con­
sciousness system that’s reflected in self report. (Flanagan 1992,141; Block 
1995, 232) Such visual information does reach phenomenal consciousness 
when the striate cortex is intact. Perhaps the most natural and influential 
explanation o f blindsight is that there is an independent ‘input channel’ 
between the visual information and the phenomenal consciousness system 
and that this input channel is impaired in blindsight (e.g., Weiskrantz 
1988, 188). In blindness, the visual information doesn’t get into the mind 
at all. But in blindsight, visual information about the ‘blind’ field gets into 
the mind without reaching phenomenal consciousness. This suggests that 
there is a further pathway between perceptual information and phenom­
enal consciousness. Furthermore, this impairment doesn’t disrupt other 
perceptual information from reaching phenomenal consciousness. Blind­
sight patients claim to have phenomenal consciousness for auditory in­
formation, tactile information, and so forth. Blindsight seems to be a se­
lective deficit in which one input channel between perceptual information 
and phenomenal consciousness is blocked, while the other input channels 
remain intact.
Blindsight is the most famous example o f a dissociation between per­
ceptual information and phenomenal consciousness, but there are a num­
ber o f analogous dissociations, suggesting that there are a number o f in­
dependent input channels that can be selectively damaged (see Shallice 
1988, Weiskrantz 1997, and Young 1998 for reviews). For instance, re­
searchers claim to have found a tactile analogue to blindsight, “blind-
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touch” or “numbsense”, in which the patient claims not to be aware of 
stimuli applied to her hand, but she can make accurate “guesses” about 
the stimuli. (Paillard et al. 1983; Rossetti et al. 1995) There is also a report 
of an auditory analogue to blindsight, “deaf hearing.” (Michel and Per- 
onnet 1980, cited in Weiskrantz 1997) There is also a kind of dissociation 
found in visual presentation o f words. Block writes, “Alexia is a neuro­
logical syndrome whose victims can no longer read a word ‘at a glance,’ 
but can only puzzle out what word they have seen at a rate of, say, one 
second per letter. Nonetheless, these subjects often show various kinds o f  
understanding o f the meanings o f words that have been flashed far too 
briefly for them to read in their laborious way.” (Block 1995, 230) Each 
of these cases suggests an independent input channel to the phenomenal 
consciousness system. For in each case, the information is in the mind, 
but not in phenomenal consciousness, despite the fact that phenomenal 
consciousness is still intact and receiving input through other channels. A 
natural inference is that the input channel between the information and 
phenomenal consciousness is disrupted, but that the other input channels 
are left intact.
It’s worth noting that in the visual modality alone, there seem to be 
multiple input channels to phenomenal consciousness. Prosopagnosiacs 
claim to have no phenomenal consciousness o f facial recognition, but 
some prosopagnosiacs can make accurate “guesses” about faces. Patients 
with simultagnosia are unable to attend to more than one object at a time. 
However, these subjects do show some perception o f objects they deny 
seeing. For instance, when shown a global “H” made up o f either small 
S’s or small H’s, the subjects claim to see only the small letter, but their 
response time is faster when the small letter and the global letter are both 
H ’s. (Rafal 1997) Patients with apperceptive visual agnosia are unable to 
name or match simple shapes like squares. Yet in at least one patient with 
this condition, studies indicated that the subject would orient her hand in 
the geometrically appropriate ways to grasp objects. (Milner and Goodale
1995) When subjects with extinction are asked to say what they are seeing, 
they tend to ignore the object shown on the side opposite the damaged 
hemisphere, and sometimes even deny seeing anything on that side. Yet 
these subjects do well if asked whether the objects are the same or different, 
and this has been interpreted as evidence that the information is not ap­
propriately transferred to consciousness. (Volpe et al. 1979) Finally, some 
patients exhibit achromatopsia, a condition in which people claim to see 
only in black and white, but can in fact make some color discriminations. 
Young writes, “In cases o f achromatopsia . . .  there is evidence that some 
aspects o f color processing mechanisms continue to function.. . .  However 
. . .  there is no subjective experience o f color.” (Young 1994,179) In each 
of these cases, it seems that there is a selective disconnection between a
Copyright © 2000. All rights reserved.
ADAPTIVE COMPLEXITY AND PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS 663
certain kind o f visual information and conscious awareness o f the infor­
mation.
The neuropsychological evidence suggests that phenomenal conscious­
ness receives information from several independent input channels. While 
some o f these findings might be given alternate interpretations (see Farah 
and Feinberg 1997 for discussion), if  anything much like what we’ve 
sketched is right, then there are numerous different channels feeding into 
phenomenal consciousness. Indeed, there seem to be numerous different 
channels feeding into visual experience alone.6 If this account is on target, 
then the phenomenal consciousness system exhibits a level o f anatomical 
complexity that plausibly requires an adaptation explanation. Indeed, the 
structure o f phenomenal consciousness is strikingly similar to the structure 
of the lateral line system. Both systems have several independent input 
channels that feed into a more central mechanism. Just as it takes energy 
to develop and maintain the network o f channels and lateral line organs 
in fish, it must take energy to create and maintain a system of multiple 
channels that provides input into phenomenal consciousness. If this kind 
o f structure did not perform any function, it would passively deteriorate 
or be actively selected against.
Obviously there are differences between the lateral line system and phe­
nomenal consciousness. We will comment on two disanalogies. First, there 
is probably a quantitative difference in the number o f input channels. The 
lateral line system consists o f dozens o f distinct input channels and the 
phenomenal consciousness system likely has fewer input channels. We see 
no reason why this quantitative difference should undermine our argu­
ment. In fact, other considerations suggest that phenomenal consciousness 
may be more complex than the lateral line system. The input channels in 
the lateral line system are all anatomically similar and provide the same 
kind o f information. In contrast, the input channels for phenomenal con­
sciousness convey different kinds of information: one channel delivers 
visuo-facial experience; another delivers color experience; a third delivers 
tactile experience, etc. Insofar as conveying different kinds o f information 
requires differentiation o f the channels, the phenomenal consciousness 
system contains a greater diversity o f specialized input structures than the 
lateral line system.
The second disanalogy is that the operative notion o f “channel” is 
slightly different in the two cases. The channels and lateral line organs are
6. As a result, even if  consciousness is not unified across sensory modalities, one might 
rely on the evidence from visual experience to argue that there is a system o f  phenom­
enal consciousness that exhibits sufficient complexity to indicate that it’s an adaptation. 
On this version o f  the argument, one need only assume unity o f  consciousness for the 
visual modality.
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visible anatomical structures. In contrast, the evidence for multiple “input 
channels” to phenomenal consciousness is less direct. Since several dif­
ferent kinds o f information can be present in the mind and yet not avail­
able to phenomenal consciousness (even while other forms o f sensory in­
put successfully reach phenomenal consciousness), it is reasonable to infer 
that the “channels” which carry these sensory inputs are physically dis­
tinct. Although these functionally characterized input channels are not 
directly visible, they must be realized by some kind o f (costly) neural struc­
ture. And, as we have argued above, one would expect that a complex 
network o f channels would deteriorate if it did not perform any useful 
function.
As with the lateral line system, then, we maintain that consciousness 
exhibits sufficient complexity to indicate that it’s an adaptation. Recall 
Maynard Smith’s remark that before researchers knew the function o f  
ampullae, “the one hypothesis that was never entertained was that the 
organ was functionless.” (1978) We suspect that if given an abstract char­
acterization o f the structure o f phenomenal consciousness, biologists 
wouldn’t even entertain the hypothesis that the system is functionless. 
Indeed, we have asked a number o f biologists, and they have all answered 
that they would expect the system, so described, to be an adaptation.7
For those with an abiding metaphysical conviction that phenomenal 
consciousness can’t be causally relevant, our complexity argument is un­
likely to carry much weight. However, if we view phenomenal conscious­
ness from the perspective o f biology rather than metaphysics, we have 
good reason to think that phenomenal consciousness is an evolutionary 
adaptation and hence causally relevant.
5. Epiphenomenal Complexity. If, as we have suggested, phenomenal con­
sciousness is an adaptation, it follows that epiphenomenalism is false. For 
if phenomenal consciousness is adaptive, it must affect behavior in some 
way that impacts fitness. It must have served some evolutionary function, 
hence it must have some causal role function, complete with outputs.8 In 
reply, an epiphenomenalist might object that the apparent complexity
7. Our argument differs from Flanagan’s psychopathology argument (section 2) in an 
important way. Flanagan infers evolutionary and causal role function from the corre­
lation between loss o f  cognitive function and loss o f  phenomenal consciousness. Be­
cause this style o f  argument is based on correlation data, it is subject to Block’s worry 
that the loss o f  function is due to disruption o f  something other than phenomenal 
consciousness. In contrast, we draw on similar data on psychopathologies to develop 
an understanding o f  the structure o f  phenomenal consciousness p erse . By showing that 
phenomenal consciousness per se has this structure, our argument provides a more 
direct response to Block’s worry about phenomenal consciousness (see section 5).
8. Strictly speaking, what follows is somewhat weaker -  if phenomenal consciousness
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of phenomenal consciousness is misleading.9 We want to distinguish two 
different kinds o f epiphenomenalist arguments here:
(1) The apparent complexity o f phenomenal consciousness is only ap­
parent, thus there’s no reason to think that it is an adaptation.
(2) The apparent complexity o f phenomenal consciousness may be 
inherited from access consciousness, thus there’s no reason to 
think that phenomenal consciousness is an adaptation.
In response to (1), we agree that if phenomenal consciousness only 
appears to be complex, then our argument is thoroughly compromised. 
But the mere possibility that phenomenal consciousness isn’t really com­
plex isn’t enough to undermine the view. This objection only works if we 
have independent reason to think that the apparent complexity o f phe­
nomenal consciousness is only apparent. Consider, by analogy, the case 
of the ampullae. It’s possible that ampullae only appear to be complex, 
but that bare possibility certainly doesn’t vitiate the argument that am­
pullae are adaptations. From a biological perspective, merely claiming 
that there might be an alternative is hardly a criticism. The complexity 
argument creates a presumption that phenomenal consciousness is an ad­
aptation, thus the critic has a burden to present evidence to overturn the 
presumption.
Argument (2) might be regarded as an attempt to supply a real alter­
native, namely, that access consciousness produces the apparent complex­
ity in phenomenal consciousness. We concede that future scientific devel­
opments might support this alternative interpretation, but we maintain 
that our complexity argument now places the burden o f proof on the 
epiphenomenalist. And it is a significant burden. To defend the claim that 
the phenomenal consciousness system inherits its complexity from some 
other system, one would have to show (a) that a second (presumably com­
plex) system exists, and (b) that the complexity o f phenomenal conscious­
ness is a free rider. Thus, the advocate o f (2) must show that the access 
consciousness system is structurally distinct from the phenomenal con­
sciousness system we have been discussing. To see why, consider the lateral 
line system in fish. Someone might claim that the lateral line system isn’t 
an adaptation, but inherits its complexity from the organ that monitors 
water currents and water pressure. This “objection” does not offer a com­
peting hypothesis unless one already has reason to claim that some other
is an adaptation, then it must have had  a causal role function in the past. As we’ll see 
in section 6, however, there is good reason to think that phenomenal consciousness still 
has a fitness-enhancing causal role function.
9. This objection was pressed in different ways by Elizabeth M eny and by Martin 
Perlmutter.
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organ has the monitoring function. Similarly, to claim that phenomenal 
consciousness isn’t really complex but inherits its complexity from the 
organ that has the function o f access consciousness doesn’t provide an 
alternative (competing) hypothesis unless one has independent evidence 
that the function o f access consciousness is subserved by a system other 
than phenomenal consciousness. If, on the other hand, the function of 
access consciousness is partly achieved by the phenomenal consciousness 
system, then phenomenal consciousness remains an adaptation: it is one 
o f the structures which has been shaped by natural selection to perform 
the function o f access consciousness.
Our reply to (2) is perfectly consistent with the claim that phenomenal 
consciousness and access consciousness can be distinguished, conceptually 
and empirically (cf. Shoemaker 1981, Dennett 1991, Flanagan 1992). For 
even if the evolutionary function o f phenomenal consciousness is access 
consciousness, it doesn’t follow that there is any conceptual or nomolog- 
ically necessary identity between phenomenal consciousness and access 
consciousness. Our account is accordingly neutral about the possibility of 
zombies. The possibility that evolution might have secured access con­
sciousness without phenomenal consciousness does not undermine the 
claim that in fact, the evolutionary function o f phenomenal consciousness 
is access consciousness. For the claim that a mechanism evolved to serve 
some function is not refuted by showing that a different mechanism could 
also serve that function. Indeed, in the same organism there can be mul­
tiple mechanisms that can serve the same function. To take a crude ex­
ample, one crucial function o f the opposable thumb is grasping; however, 
people who have lost the use o f their hands can develop a serviceable 
grasping capacity with their toes. In light of this, consider again Hum­
phrey’s monkey Helen. The fact that Helen seems to have acquired a kind 
of access consciousness in the absence o f phenomenal consciousness does 
not show that the evolutionary function o f phenomenal consciousness is 
not access consciousness. What it might instead show is a kind o f plasticity 
o f mind that allows the function o f access consciousness to be served even 
in the absence o f phenomenal consciousness.
Thus, the evolutionary approach suggests a new way to respond to the 
epiphenomenalist. In light o f the apparent complexity o f phenomenal con­
sciousness, to deny that phenomenal consciousness serves a function is a 
theoretical excrescence.
6. Adaptive Complexity and the Causal Role Function of Phenomenal Con­
sciousness. Not only can the complexity o f a system indicate that the sys­
tem is an adaptation, the nature o f the complexity can provide clues about 
the function of the system. For if a complex organ was selectively advan­
tageous, then the characteristics that make the organ complex probably
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contributed to fitness. Thus, the following seems to be a plausible Principle 
of Adaptive Complexity:
If a trait exhibits sufficient complexity to indicate that the trait is an 
adaptation, the complexity o f the trait is probably functionally rele­
vant. That is, the features that make the organ complex likely con­
tribute to its adaptedness.
This is an important feature o f complexity arguments, and it can play a 
role in specifying the function o f the organ when the complexity is rec­
ognized before the function is.10 We recognize that inferences from struc­
ture to function can go wrong in a variety o f ways (see, e.g., Lauder 1996). 
Nonetheless, we think that the Principle o f Adaptive Complexity provides 
important clues about the evolutionary function o f consciousness.
In the case o f the lateral line system, the Principle o f Adaptive Com­
plexity suggests that the lateral line system integrates information trans­
mitted through the lateral line organs. That seems to be the best expla­
nation for why there are so many distinct lateral line organs feeding into 
the lateral line nerve. Obviously, this account is still seriously underdes­
cribed as a functional characterization. Even if the function o f the lateral 
line system is information integration, this still doesn’t tell us what infor­
mation gets integrated. We certainly couldn’t conclude simply from the 
Principle o f Adaptive Complexity that the lateral line system computes 
information about water current and water pressure.
Just as the complex structure o f the lateral line system indicates that 
the system integrates information from the lateral line organs, it seems 
that the similarly complex structure o f phenomenal consciousness indi­
cates that phenomenal consciousness integrates information received from 
the independent input channels. Obviously, this ‘information integration’ 
proposal is an extremely thin account o f the function o f phenomenal con­
sciousness, and a much more detailed defense would be required to make 
this account persuasive. But the general picture o f the function o f phe­
nomenal consciousness that emerges is close to Fodor’s notion o f “hori­
zontal faculty”. Fodor (1983) describes a horizontal faculty as a “func­
tionally distinguishable cognitive system whose operations cross content 
domains” (13); horizontal systems “operate, inter alia, to exploit the in­
formation that the input systems provide.” (103) The proposal, then, is 
that phenomenal consciousness is a horizontal faculty that integrates in­
formation from independent input channels to produce outputs that are 
sensitive to the range o f inputs. On this proposal, it is plausible that the 
integration function would have been adaptively important. The integra­
10. Our suggestions on complexity and evolutionary function were influenced by Pe- 
setsky and Block (1990).
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tion o f inputs from various mechanisms would enable the organism to 
behave in a way that is sensitive to a wide range o f information across 
different modalities.
The Principle o f Adaptive Complexity only provides a thin character­
ization o f the function o f phenomenal consciousness. But if  the epiphen­
omenalist threat is quelled by the complexity argument, then we might 
appeal to other sources o f evidence to further characterize the function of 
phenomenal consciousness. In particular, we can exploit the evidence from 
psychopathologies again, but not to combat epiphenomenalism; rather, 
we can consult the evidence simply to see what causal functions are dis­
rupted when information does not reach phenomenal consciousness. At 
this point, we can return to the evidence that patients with deficits in 
phenomenal consciousness exhibit corresponding deficits in rational ac­
tion (e.g. Marcel 1986, Van Gulick 1989, Flanagan 1992). This suggests 
that the function o f phenomenal consciousness is indeed something like 
access consciousness. For it seems that phenomenal consciousness serves 
the function o f integrating information in the service o f reasoning and 
action. N o doubt this is still a vastly oversimplified account o f the function 
of phenomenal consciousness. But even in the absence o f a more developed 
account, it’s plausible that having a system that performs this function of 
integration and access was adaptive for our ancestors and that it continues 
to be important for our biological success.
7. Conclusion. Several philosophers maintain that we need to think about 
phenomenal consciousness as just another biological phenomenon. We 
have argued that if we approach the issue in a relentlessly biological fash­
ion, the apparent complexity o f phenomenal consciousness indicates that 
it is an adaptation. Given the apparent complexity o f phenomenal con­
sciousness, evolutionary principles suggest that it’s prima facie implausible 
that phenomenal consciousness doesn’t do anything. Furthermore, if this 
complexity argument works, it provides the basis for developing an ac­
count o f the function of phenomenal consciousness as well.
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